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Simulation of propositional content does not sufficiently explain real-life 
linguistic activity, even for action-related language. In addition, how we get 
from propositional content to implicit and inferential meaning needs to be 
explained. Indeed, simulative understanding is immediate, automatic and 
reflex-like while an explicit interpretative act, even if not always needed, is 
still a part of many linguistic activities. The aim of this paper is to present 
the hypothesis that speaking is a complex ability realized by means of at 
least two different mechanisms that are likely developed at different and 
consecutive steps of cognitive and linguistic development. The first 
mechanism has a neural explanation grounded in the notion of embodied 
simulation. The second implies socio-cognitive skills such as Theory of 
Mind. In order to fully develop the second mechanism, a symbolic 
communication and interaction with a cultural community are needed. This 
hypothesis will be tested by looking at the acquisition of linguistic negation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is an assumption, popular among philosophers, that the brain proces-
ses that make for cognition are one sort of thing and that the brain processes 
that contribute to motor control belong to an entirely different category. 
(Churchland 1986: 451) 
 
It is interesting to note that philosophers such as Epicuro, Campanella, Vico, and 
Condillac all held the hypothesis that cognition is deeply grounded in our 
corporal and motor experience even though they did not have the knowledge of 
neurobiology that we have today. 
 However, since Patricia Churchland’s book came out in the late eighties, 
experimental data (especially the discovery of mirror neurons in primates; 
Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al. 2001, 1996) has confirmed the hypothesis that 
cognition and language are embodied. Consequentially, philosophers who still 
considered brain processes for cognition as radically different from processes for 
motor control have moved away from that bias. However, the embodiment of 
language and cognition might not fully explain human cognitive and linguistic 
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abilities. The aim of this paper is to present the hypothesis that speaking is a 
complex ability realized by means of at least two different mechanisms that are 
likely developed at different and consecutive steps of linguistic and cognitive 
development. The first mechanism has a neural explanation grounded in 
embodied semantics and mental simulation (Gallese & Lakoff 2005). The second 
implies socio-cognitive skills such as Theory of Mind. In order to fully develop 
the second mechanism, a symbolic communication and interaction with a cultur-
al community are needed. Hence, the origin of man’s complex species-specific 
language and cognition is in both the brain and in culture (Deacon 1997; Toma-
sello 1999; Arbib 2009). This hypothesis will be tested by looking at the acqui-
sition of linguistic negation.  
 
 
2. The Acquisition of Negation in Normal Development 
 
In first-language learning three broad categories of negation consecutively arise 
(see Dimroth 2010 for a review): (1) rejection/refusal, (2) disappearance/non-
existence/unfulfilled expectation, (3) denial. According to many studies (Volterra 
& Antinucci 1979; Pea 1980; Choi 1988), rejection is the first category of negation 
to be acquired. Children use “no” to express refusal of something existing in their 
present context. However, we can find examples of rejection in human pre-
linguistic gestures and even in animal behaviour. In fact, before the time children 
start to produce the single word “no” to express rejection, they have already 
expressed rejection non-linguistically. Rejection, according to Pea (1980) does not 
require abstract mental representations, while non-existence and denial do 
require them.  
 The second category of linguistic negation to arise is non-existence/ 
unfulfilled expectation. At this point, children are able to signal the absence or 
disappearance of an expected referent in the context of speech or to indicate 
something that violates their expectations, based on previous experience (for 
instance, malfunctioning toys). 
 Lastly, the third category to be acquired is denial. Denial implies negation 
of a predication. The referent is usually symbolically expressed. As Bloom (1970) 
argues, to deny children must have the ability to discern between their own 
knowledge of the world and the knowledge of their listener. In order to deny a 
sentence, children have to deal with two propositions, one affirming and one 
negating the same predication; and they have to ascribe one of these to the 
person they are speaking to. “To deny the truth of another person’s statement 
entails the understanding that the other person may hold different beliefs, or that 
language is itself a representation of reality, not reality itself” (Tager-Flusberg 
1999: 328). Denial is usually acquired by the age of two and a half years. 
 According to Antinucci & Volterra (1979) categories of negation are 
acquired according to the complexity of the inferences that they entail. At the 
beginning of this process, children are only able to make inferences about their 
present perceptual situation. Thus, at first, children can only negate (rejecting, 
prohibiting, or expressing non-existence) something currently present in the per-
ceptual context of speech or something that was just present in the speech con-
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text. Later on, as children start to express denial, they become able to read their 
listeners presuppositions. At this time, children rely both on perceptual and prag-
matic context. 
 Choi (1988), in her longitudinal study on English-, French-, and Korean-
speaking children aged between 1;7 and 3;4 (years;months), went into more depth 
in the description of semantic categories of negation. She identified nine functi-
ons of negation that usually arise in three different phases. 
 
(1) a. Phase 1: non-existence, prohibition, rejection, failure. 
 b. Phase 2: denial, inability, epistemic negation. 
 c. Phase 3: normative negation, inferential negation. 
(Choi 1988: 525) 
 
 In Phase 3, Choi introduced the category of inferential negation that indi-
cates “the child’s inferences about the listener” (Choi 1988: 524). She refers to an 
interesting example of inferential negation: 
 
(2) (Kyle has broken a few crayons. The experimenter has been scolding Kyle 
for breaking crayons. Kyle picks up a broken crayon which he did not 
break and looks at the experimenter.) 
K: I not broken this. 
(Choi 1988: 525) 
 
 This example clearly requires false belief understanding. In fact, when Kyle 
says “I not broken this”, he is reasoning with the experimenter's belief. Specifical-
ly, Kyle supposes that the experimenter believes that he has broken that crayon 
while this was not the case (false belief). This example of inferential negation was 
recorded when Kyle was 2;8.  
 After the one-word utterance period, when children start to utter their first 
sentences, according to Bloom’s (1970) study, non-existence is the first category of 
negative sentences to arise, not rejection. Denial is still the last category to be 
acquired, despite the fact that the syntactic structure of denial is less complex 
than non-existence. According to Bloom, denial requires more cognitive effort 
from children.  
 Hence, according to the data we have seen thus far, we can say, following 
Pea (1980: 165) that the expression of negation, from simplex to complex forms, 
requires underlying cognitive representations of increasing complexity. The first 
expression of negation does not require internal abstract representation because 
the rejected object is present in the perceptual scene; later on, with the expression 
of a disappearance, abstract mental representation is required because the 
negated object or person is no longer present in the speech event context; finally, 
when truth-functional negation is used to deny a predication, a second-order 
abstract representation is required. 
 Nevertheless, Pea (1980) does not agree with the opinion of Antinucci & 
Volterra (1979) that, in order to deny, children must attribute a presupposition to 
their listener. Many times, he argues, children express negation without addres-
sing a person. Moreover, he claims, there is not enough independent experiment-
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al evidence supporting Antinucci & Volterra’s assertion that two-year-olds are 
able to infer other people’s mental states.  
 However, we know that the development of Theory of Mind begins early. 
During the second year of life, for example, language acquisition seems to 
heavily rely on the ability of reading other people’s intentions (De Villiers 2000). 
Furthermore, children start to use mental verbs like think, know, etc. in their third 
year of life (i.e. before they are able to pass the false belief task). Currently, we 
also have evidence showing that even 15-month-old children can understand 
false beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005).  
 Moreover, it is worth noting that linguistic negation, at least denial, is a 
metalinguistic operator. Negation cannot be referentially used. Even in a negative 
descriptive sentence (e.g., It is not raining.), negation does not have its own 
referent. Negation never concerns a fact in a real or fictional world, nor an ab-
stract concept like “elegance” or “rationality”, nor an action. Negation is meta-
linguistic because it implies an operation on a proposition. That is to say, ne-
gation is the operation of setting a false value for the proposition it is referring to 
(and this is the same operation we also make in the more complex linguistic 
action of lying). Thus, negation, or at least denial, seems to imply a second order 
mental representation. In fact, by expressing a denial toward a listener, the child 
is representing a content, negating that content (by setting a false value) and 
attributing the negated content to the listener.  
 Thus, following the considerations of Antinucci & Volterra (1988), we can 
argue that the complex forms of negation, which are metalinguistic in their 
nature, regardless of what different names they may be called, entail the ability to 
attribute mental states to others and even to understand false beliefs.  
 Thus, psycholinguistic studies on linguistic negation show that negation 
can express very different functions that arise at different steps of language 
acquisition and that have different cognitive requirements. In what follows, it 
will be argued that we need two different mechanisms in order to account for the 
acquisition of these different functions of linguistic negation. 
 
 
3. What Model of Linguistic Development can Account for the Acquisition 
of Negation? 
 
So far, we have seen that there are at least three steps of increasing complexity in 
the acquisition of linguistic negation. The question that will be addressed now is: 
What model of linguistic development can account for the acquisition of 
negation?  
 A two-level model for language acquisition will be presented. In particular, 
the hypothesis that we can account for the first categories of negation, rejection 
and non-existence (the first step of language competence in this model) and even 
for the comprehension of the negated content of a denied sentence in a simulative 
paradigm will be proposed. Embodied simulation, however, does not sufficiently 
explain denial (the second step of language competence). While in a simulative 
account, based on motor simulation, our understanding of others is “immediate, 
automatic and almost reflex-like” (Gallese 2007), and our comprehension of 
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action-related language is realized by means of a neural simulation of the perti-
nent action, as neuro-imaging and Transcranic Magnetic Stimulation studies have 
widely shown (Buccino et al. 2005; Tettamanti et al. 2005), an explicit interpret-
ative act is needed in order to explicitly attribute negated/simulated information 
to someone else. Hence, simulation of the propositional content is not enough to 
explain denial. We need to introduce more complex inferential abilities that are 
not only the product of our brain, but also of our interaction with a cultural com-
munity.  
 The latter claim about the explicitness of denial could be challenged by 
saying that there is not any need to envisage an explicit act in order to attribute 
the negated information to someone else. Indeed, recently Gallese & Sinigaglia 
(2011) have argued that by means of embodied simulation a given content can be 
implicitly attributed to others because embodied simulation entails a functional, 
non-representational form of mental state attribution. However, what character-
izes linguistic denial is exactly the explicit negation of someone else's mental 
state. Thus, in this case by accepting the claim that an explicit attribution is not 
necessary to denial because an implicit functional attribution of mental states can 
be realized by means of embodied simulation, it would follow that when denying 
we are explicitly negating a content that is implicitly attributed. And this means 
that, at some point, that content should become explicitly accessible. Then again, 
even if we buy into Gallese & Sinigaglia’s proposal about the functional and non-
representational nature of mental state attribution realized by means of em-
bodied simulation, we still need to introduce an inferential process that acts on 
explicit accessible content. This, obviously, does not happen for every inferential 
activity in which we are involved. But it is necessary for some human activities, 
and denial seems to be among them. 
 
3.1. Simulating Negation 
 
According to many authors (Barsalou 1999; Pulvermüller 1999, 2002; Gallese & 
Lakoff 2005; Gallese 2008), linguistic meaning is embodied. This means that the 
comprehension of an action-related word or sentence activates the same neural 
structures that enable the execution of that action. Gallese (2008) presented this 
hypothesis as the “neural exploitation hypothesis”. Language exploits the same 
brain circuits as action. According to this hypothesis, our linguistic and social 
abilities are grounded in our sensory-motor system. The Mirror Neurons System 
(MNS) is the neural structure that supports both our motor abilities and our 
social skills, language included. Thus, in this account, actions and language 
comprehension are mediated by motor simulation. This even holds true for the 
understanding of abstract linguistic meanings. Indeed, in that case, mental 
imagery and metaphorical thought allow us to map from a sensory-motor domain to 
an abstract domain. This mechanism, according to Gallese & Lakoff (2005), is the 
basis for the construction and comprehension of abstract linguistic meaning. 
 Moreover, it has been pointed out that language comprehension also relies 
on other kinds of embodied simulation, not only on motor simulation. For 
example, Engelen et al. (2011) elaborated and tested a model for the development 
of language comprehension in which perceptual simulation is central. According 
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to these authors, a perceptual simulation of an event is created every time we 
listen to or read a description of that event. In this view, children exploit the 
process of perceptual simulation even if they have a limited knowledge of the 
objects involved. The role of sensory simulation in language comprehension has 
also been highlighted by Wojciehowski & Gallese (2011). Their approach focuses 
on the idea of the “Feeling of the Body” that is the product of sensory-motor 
simulation processes that enable us to immediately understand not only basic 
motor intensions but also the feelings and emotions of others. The experience of 
the “Feeling of the Body”, in the authors’ view, is fundamental when we ap-
proach literary texts and explains the sense of identification with and connected-
ness to narrated characters that we feel while reading stories. Recently, also furth-
er research conducted on the role of embodied emotion and introspection in lang-
uage comprehension (Barsalou et al. 2003, Kousta et al. 2011) has contributed to 
giving us a richer and more powerful picture of the embodied language studies.  
 According to this view, many features of language seem to be bodily 
grounded. Lately many studies have also been devoted to the understanding of 
simulation processes in the comprehension of negated sentences (for example, 
Kaup et al. 2006; Tettamanti et al. 2008). To date, the neural mechanisms that 
underlie the processing of negation are still unclear. Tettamanti and colleagues 
carried out an experiment that aimed to identify the brain mechanisms that 
underlie the comprehension of negative sentences.  
 As Tettamanti et al. (2008) noted, psycholinguistic data on the comprehen-
sion of negative utterances seems to lead to different conclusions. On one hand, 
data from sentence comprehension (for example, Carpenter & Just 1975) suggests 
that a negative sentence is cognitively more demanding than the corresponding 
affirmative sentence. And this should indicate a stronger neural activation for a 
negative sentence than for its affirmative counterpart. On the other hand, data 
from studies on the accessibility of information (for example, Kaup & Zwaan 
2003) suggest that negated information is cognitively less accessible.  
 The main aim of the Tettamanti et al. study was to test whether the impact 
of negation on neural activation is dependent on the semantic field of the negated 
content. Considering previous results, two possible outcomes were predicted by 
the authors. Negation could determine a reduced accessibility of the content of 
the negated sentence with, consequently, a lower neural activation for simulation 
in the left fronto-parieto-temporal and in the posterior cingulate cortex (content 
dependent hypothesis). Alternatively, negation could determine higher cognitive 
loads, due to a greater syntactic complexity. In this case, the processing of ne-
gation will lead to a higher, content independent, neural activation in the left 
perisylvian areas.  
 Results of Tettamanti et al.’s (2008) study confirmed previous findings on 
the accessibility of information (Kaup & Zwaan 2003). The authors say that “Ne-
gation is encoded by our brain in terms of a reduced activation of the areas re-
presenting the negated information”. 
 Thus, the Tettamanti et al. study seems to be congruent with the hypothesis 
proposed by Kaup & Zwaan (2003, 2007) that the processing of negation enables 
a lower neural activation of the negated content in the brain, both of action-
related and abstract content. 
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 For the sake of clarity it should be noted that Kaup & Zwaan (2007) 
proposed a two-step simulation hypothesis of negation. According to their model, the 
comprehension of a negative sentence is realized firstly by means of a simulation 
of the negated content that is soon followed by a brief simulation of the actual 
state of affairs. At this point, information about the negated content is less acces-
sible, this finding is congruent with Tettamanti et al.’s (2008) results. Moreover, 
this hypothesis can even account for data from sentence comprehension tasks (for 
example Carpenter & Just 1975). Indeed, in the first step of the comprehension of 
a negative sentence, the comprehender has to manage with two simulations, i.e. 
the simulation of the negated content and the simulation of the actual state of 
affairs. Hence, it is plausible that in this first step, a negative sentence is 
cognitively more demanding resulting in a longer response time. 
 The two-step simulation hypothesis was tested by means of a set of experi-
ments that assessed time responses in recognition tasks. Participants read a sen-
tence and then were shown a picture. They had to decide whether objects in the 
picture matched objects mentioned in the sentence. Responses were faster when 
depicted objects matched those mentioned in the sentences, even for negated 
contents. Thus, the same response-time pattern was found both for affirmative 
and negative sentences. In a different condition, pictures were shown with a 
longer delay. In this case, different response-time patterns were observed for 
negative and affirmative sentences, with negative sentences showing signifi-
cantly slower responses. Thus, the results seemed to confirm the two-step 
simulation hypothesis, with less accessible information about the negated content 
in the second step. 
 It should be noted that in the studies on the simulative processes of 
negative sentences, negation is considered to be a monolithic syntactic function. 
The authors did not consider that different functions, with different cognitive and 
pragmatic demands, can be carried out in language by the same morpheme. 
Thus, to simulate the content, both the actual or the negated content of a 
sentence, does not supply a complete explanation of the comprehension of 
negation. “No” can express a rejection or a denial and the cognitive distance from 
the former to the latter is considerable. Moreover, it should be noted that 
Pragmatics usually classifies two different kinds of negation: descriptive and 
metalinguistic negation (Horn 1985). Descriptive negation refers to a state of 
affairs in the world while metalinguistic negation acts on presuppositions, 
implicatures and formal aspects of language like morphology or phonology. 
According to Kaup and colleagues, “the experiential view conceptualizes lang-
uage comprehension as the performance of a sensory-motor simulation of the 
described sequence of events” (Kaup et al. 2007: 265). Hence, these studies seem 
to only be focused on descriptive negation. Language, however, is not always just 
the description of an abstract or action related state of events. Even if a 
simulation of the content occurs, and this seems to be the case, this does not 
sufficiently explain the complex inferential process that occurs in linguistic 
denial. In real life, in many cases, by denying a sentence, a speaker is denying 
presuppositions or implicatures of his co-speaker.  
 From the point of view of the speaker, this entails the ability of attributing 
mental states to the others and of following their inferences. The speaker is 
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explicitly attributing a mental content to the interlocutor and he is then negating 
that content. Thus, the speaker is holding the actual and the negated content of 
the inference in his mind and he is explicitly attributing one of them to the 
interlocutor. In addition, in order to realize this attribution the speaker needs to 
rely on background and shared knowledge.  
 From the point of view of the interlocutor, the comprehension of negative 
sentences is not always just a matter of simulation of the propositional content. In 
fact, in order to correctly understand a cancelling implicature negation, the 
interlocutor needs to understand the inferences that can be drawn from the 
negated content of the sentence. This entails explicit mindreading for the inter-
locutor as well. Intentional and highly inferential communication is often explicit 
in the minds of speakers. 
 A simulation process of the propositional content can also be taking place 
with cancelling implicature negation. This is not questioned here. However the 
simulation of the propositional content is only a part of the full process of 
language comprehension.  
 It would be interesting to test the simulative processes at work during the 
production of inferential negative sentences. Is the content of inferential commu-
nication simulated as well? Do we simulate both the literal and the inferential 
meaning of those sentences? Which are the brain circuitries that implement our 
more complex inferential abilities? These issues are still waiting for an answer.  
 Interesting studies have been carried out on the ability to draw inferences 
during language comprehension and to integrate semantics and world 
knowledge. For instance, Chow et al. (2008) carried out an fMRI study in which 
participants were asked to read short passages and predict the development of 
the situations by drawing correct inferences. To trigger the participants to 
generate the correct inference, each short passage was followed by a lexical-
decision task. The authors manipulated the predictability of the target words in 
the lexical decision-task. Predictable words were those not explicitly mentioned 
in the short passages but inferable from them. This study, thus, investigated the 
neural mechanisms sub-serving inference processes. However, it does not seem 
to address the problem of so-called pragmatic intrusion, namely to what extent is 
semantics pragmatically determined? In other words, this study is focused on the 
problem of predictive inferences in language comprehension while it does not 
address the different problem of the “intended meaning” of an utterance. It 
seems likely that we need inferential abilities to understand the meaning of an 
utterance, what the speaker is talking about, and not only to predict the event 
that can follow from the uttering of that sentence. 
 Another issue, then, is worthy of remark here. Studies on the simulative 
processes of negative sentences are carried out in the field of embodied 
semantics. The definition of meaning in this field of research seems to be 
problematic. Action-related meanings are represented in the brain through a 
mental simulation realized in the same sensory-motor circuitries that enable 
actions. Thus, in this view, a part of our vocabulary is built on our sensory-motor 
possibilities. Metaphorical thought and mental imagery allow us to have abstract 
meanings (Gallese & Lakoff 2005). 
 The problem with this account is that it considers semantics, specifically 
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action-related words, as a stable field (dictionary model of language). For 
example, Meteyard et al. (2012) reviewed the work that has been done in the last 
decade on the topic of embodied language. The authors classified language 
theories, putting them on a continuum between those that are fully embodied 
and those that are fully disembodied. Semantics, in all of these works, seems to 
be conceived of as the link between a word and its representation, that can be 
more or less embodied. These representations also seem to be pretty stable, no 
room is left for pragmatics in the definition of semantic representations. 
However, language does not work as a rigid code. We can play with words, we 
can use irony, we can lie or we can simply be misunderstood. This is possible 
because meaning, in real-life linguistic activity, is mostly constructed in the 
context of speech. Indeed, many authors have been suggesting that we should 
abandon the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Meaning, in this 
view, is constructed in every context of speech on the basis of the speakers, their 
background knowledge, their level of shared knowledge, their goals (Carapezza 
& Biancini 2012) and the physical context of the speech act. 
 Imagine a boy that returns home. His father sees him and asks: “So?” — 
and the boy answers with a smile: “It was fine”. This conversation could only be 
understood by one who shares their same background knowledge. For example, 
the boy could have returned from an exam or a job interview. Or a date with a 
girl that he really likes. The father is asking about the outcome. Thus, it is likely 
that in this case both the father and the son are performing a mental simulation. 
But is the mental simulation pertinent to the words So and It was fine or, more 
likely, to the implicit meanings that can be inferred from those words? Moreover, 
these very same words uttered in a different context by different people would 
have a very different meaning. 
 Thus, studies on embodied language should discuss the notions of meaning 
and semantics further. Linguistic activity seems to not only be realized by means 
of a fixed and conventional repertoire of meanings, even in the case of action-
related language. Up to now, the role of pragmatics and inferential processes are 
still missing in this research paradigm. Hence, inferential processes involved in 
language comprehension seem to be the next step that should be addressed in 
embodied language research. 
 In particular, studies of simulative processes of negation show an overt 
bias, the consideration of negation as mainly as descriptive while ignoring its 
metalinguistic functions (Horn 1985). Examples of negation that cancels presup-
positions and implicatures, i.e. metalinguistic negation, can be easily found in 
everyday conversations. Below, are a few example dialogues: 
 
(3) (Andy meets Barry.) 
 A: I saw you at the restaurant yesterday. 
 B: I did not move from my apartment. 
 A: Sorry, I was pretty sure that you were the man I saw with your wife! 
 After this conversation Barry goes home and says to his wife Carol: 
 B: You were at the restaurant with another man yesterday! 
 (Carol replies with a very classical answer.) 
 C: It isn’t what you think! 
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(4) In a big company there was a cash deficit. The boss addresses one of his 
employees with these words: 
 Boss: You have recently bought a very expensive car, John. 
 John: I did not do anything that was beyond my possibilities. 
 
In all of these examples, negative sentences negate a presupposition or impli-
cature of the interlocutor. In the first case, Barry is negating the presupposition of 
Andy that Barry was the man at the restaurant. Carol is negating the implicature 
of Barry that she was cheating on him. Finally, the employee is negating the 
implicature of his boss that he stole money.  
 It is likely that in understanding these negative sentences, we start with a 
simulation. Following Kaup & Zwaan (2007), it is likely that we start with a 
simulation of the negated content and then we simulate the actual state of affairs. 
However, a simulation of the actual or the negated content is not sufficient in 
order to understand these dialogues. The boss is not explicitly saying that the em-
ployee stole the money. He is implying this sentence. And the employee is not 
explicitly negating this implicature. His negative sentence is an implicit negation 
of the boss’s implicature. 
 Thus, the simulation of the propositional content is not sufficient in order 
to explain real-life linguistic activity. In addition, we need to explain how we get 
from the propositional content to those inferential meanings that are not 
explicitly stated but are explicitly accessed by speakers. 
 Simulative understanding is the first step in language acquisition that we 
reach during ontogeny and very likely it was the first step in phylogeny as well. 
However, at some point we got more complex socio-cognitive abilities that made 
more sophisticated linguistic activities possible. In competent speakers, these two 
mechanisms interact, making it hard to isolate one from the other.  
 Concerning the acquisition of linguistic negation, we can understand 
rejection and non-existence in the simulative paradigm. However, it is very 
unlikely that denial can be accounted for in this same paradigm, in particular for 
cases of presupposition cancelling negation or implicature cancelling negation. In 
order to account for denial we need to introduce explicit inferential abilities. The 
inferential level of linguistic negation will be the topic discussed in the next 
section. 
 
3.2. The Inferential Level of Negation 
 
The examples discussed in the previous paragraph seem to suggest that 
simulating the negated or actual content of a proposition is not always sufficient 
in order to understand negative sentences even if these are action-related. If our 
understanding of propositions such as those presented in the previous examples 
were based on a simulation of the propositional content, then much of the 
meaning of those dialogues would be lost. A simulation is most likely taking 
place. However, many questions arise about the content and temporal dynamic 
of this simulation. Only further empirical investigation can help to answer these 
questions. 
 Up to now, we have argued that complex socio-cognitive abilities are 
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needed in order to produce and comprehend denial, the most complex form of 
negation. The next question we are going to address will be: Is there any 
empirical evidence supporting this claim? 
 We try to answer this question by looking at the acquisition of linguistic 
negation in autistic children. Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder with 
three characteristic features: social impairments, communicative-linguistic 
impairments, and repetitive and stereotyped behaviors (Tager-Flusberg 1999). 
The first two aspects of autism are usually referred to as a condition of “mind-
blindness”, that is, the inability to read our and other people’s mental states 
(mindreading). Hence, according to this account, autistic subjects have a specific 
deficiency in understanding other people’s mental states and, as a consequence of 
this lack of comprehension, they have communicative and social deficiencies. 
Indeed, the ability of attributing mental states such as intentions, beliefs, desires, 
etc., to other people is the ground for social behaviors and linguistic communi-
cation.  
 Because they lack the mindreading ability, autistic individuals have diffi-
culties in interpreting other people’s communication and behavior. Different 
hypotheses have been proposed to explain this disorder. Baron-Cohen (2002), 
following a hypothesis originally proposed by Asperger (1947), gave empirical 
support to the idea that autism can be considered as an extreme form of the male 
brain. In other words, autistic individuals demonstrate hyper-developed 
systemizing abilities, i.e. they perform over the average in tasks that require 
identifying the variables of a system and predicting its rule-governed behaviors 
while they perform poorly in all the tasks that require empathizing with others. It 
is worth noting that both men and women have the systemizing and empathizing 
skills but usually women have more developed empathizing skills then men and 
vice versa, men have more developed systemizing abilities. The extreme male 
brain that seems to characterize autism, thus, is a particular combination of these 
abilities that consists in hyper-developed systemizing skills and hypo-developed 
empathizing skills. This is, of course, only one of the hypotheses that have been 
put on the table about this enigmatic pathology. Lately, the alternative 
explanation that subjects with autism spectrum disorder have a dysfunction of 
the mirror neurons system consisting in its disordered activity has also been 
considered (Iacoboni & Dapretto 2006). According to this hypothesis, this dys-
function of the mirror system is responsible for the lack of that immediate and 
automatic attunement with others that makes us able to understand their basic 
motor intentions. 
 In any case, whatever can be considered to be the origin of this pathology, 
one of the defining characteristics of autism is mind-blindness. However, this 
mindreading deficiency can be experienced to different degrees and this means 
that differences among individuals in the severity of symptoms are likely to be 
observed. 
  So far, we have made two points. Firstly, we have examined the cognitive 
requirements underlying the acquisition of linguistic negation, arguing that in its 
complex forms, linguistic negation requires second-order mental representations 
and complex mindreading abilities. Secondly, we have identified a neuro-
developmental disorder, autism, where subjects are expected to show a specific 
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deficiency in mindreading. Now, if these two assumptions are correct, autistic 
individuals should find complex forms of linguistic negations difficult to inter-
pret correctly. And this seems, in fact, to be the case. 
 Shapiro & Kapit (1978) looked at the use of linguistic negation in autistic 
children and in typically developing 3- and 5-years-old controls. Subjects had to 
follow an experimenter’s instructions eliciting comprehension, production or imi-
tation of negative sentences. Findings suggested that autistic children used a dif-
ferent strategy than their controls in accomplishing the tasks. In fact, they 
performed better than controls in the imitation task but had significantly lower 
performances in production. All groups performed better in comprehension than 
in imitation. Still the autistic children’s performances in comprehension were 
lower than the 5-years-olds and even lower than one of the two groups of 3-year-
old normally developing controls. Shapiro & Kapit (1978: 349) find that “the 
autistic subjects produce fewer and more rigid negations as well as imitating 
well, suggesting adequate registration and reply but poor integrative processing 
of linguistic form for social and communicative use”. 
 Moreover, Tager-Flusberg et al. (1990) looked at language acquisition in 
autistic children and children with Down syndrome. Children were visited in 
their homes and video-taped while playing with their mothers. Conversations 
were subsequently transcribed by the experimenters. Results showed that autistic 
and Down syndrome children acquired syntactic structure to express negation in 
the same order as typically developing children. However, autistic children only 
used syntactic structures of negation to express rejection and non-existence while 
at later stages, children with Down syndrome also express the function of denial. 
Significantly, the expression of denial was absent in the linguistic production of 
autistic children. The authors interpreted these findings as a result of a lack in 
Theory of mind, under the assumption that denial requires attributing mental 
states to the listener. “This paucity of denial reflects impairments in Theory of 
mind. […] These aspects of mental state understanding are specifically impaired 
in autism and it is therefore not surprising that this function of language, denial, 
is almost never used by young children with autism” (Tager-Flusberg 1999: 332). 
 Delayed negation processing was found by Schindele et al. (2008) even in 
adults diagnosed with high-functioning autism and Asperger’s syndrome. 
Subjects were required to read short stories ending with either a negative or 
affirmative sentence. Depending on the context, the last sentence could be 
pragmatically felicitous or infelicitous. Normal controls only read negative final 
sentences in the pragmatically infelicitous context slowly while the two clinical 
groups had no context-related effect, showing longer reading times for negative 
sentences in both conditions. 
 The data about the production and comprehension of negative sentences in 
autistic individuals seems to support the conclusion that complex socio-cognitive 
abilities are needed in order to produce and comprehend denial. Indeed, when 
the ability to understand other people’s mental states is impaired, production 
and comprehension of denial is impaired as well. 
 The next step will be to put all of these elements in a unitary model for 
language acquisition. 
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3.3. Putting Together Simulative and Inferential Abilities into a Two Step-
Model for Language Acquisition 
 
So far, we have seen that different kinds of embodied simulations occur in 
language comprehension. We have also seen that in many occasions the simu-
lation of the propositional content does not sufficiently explain the pragmatic 
level of linguistic communication. Most linguistic meaning is implicitly commu-
nicated through inferential processes. What can all of this data tell us about the 
acquisition of language?  
 Children have a language-ready brain, but they need to be in a speaking 
community in order to start speaking themselves. Even Noam Chomsky made 
this kind of assertion (Chomsky 1988). Unlike what Chomsky believed, the claim 
here is that having a language-ready brain is not the same as having an innate, 
domain-specific, device for language.  
 Arbib (2009: 265) hypothesizes that the language-ready brain resulted from 
the evolution of a progression of mirror systems and linked brain regions 
‘‘beyond the mirror’’ that made the full expression of their functionality possible. 
 Following the mirror system hypothesis advanced by Arbib and Rizzolatti 
for phylogeny (Arbib & Rizzolatti 1997, Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998), the proposal 
made here for ontogeny is that children have a language-ready brain that, based 
on mental simulation implemented by the mirror neuron system, makes the start 
of the acquisition of language possible. At this first step, the mirror neuron 
system provides us with the ability to approximately comprehend intentions, 
mainly motor intentions, and to start the process of language acquisition. In fact, 
the mirror neuron system can explain the so-called construction grammar model 
for language acquisition (Tomasello 1999) in terms of intention understanding, 
imitative learning and simulative understanding. 
 At this point, when the child enters the linguistic game, it is language itself 
that affects his or her cognitive functions and even brain. For example, the 
acquisition of literacy affects brain lateralization. Illiterate subjects, according to 
Arbib (2009), are more right-lateralized than literate controls.  
 Language makes our socio-cognitive abilities more complex. In particular, a 
full language shared by a cultural community makes our mindreading ability far 
more complex. Once the child acquires an explicit mindreading ability he or she 
is now ready to enter the second step of language acquisition. In fact, an explicit 
mindreading ability allows children to produce and comprehend inferential and 
implicit linguistic communication. The simulation of the propositional content by 
itself is not enough, even if it is very likely that simulations are taking place as 
well (Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011). Thus, at least two different neural mechanisms 
seem to be involved in language comprehension. On the one hand, language is 
deeply grounded in our sensory-motor abilities which are exploited via the 
mechanism of embodied simulation. On the other hand, we probably make use of 
a different neural mechanism that sub-serves inferential reasoning and that is an 
integral part of our linguistic skills (see for, example, Chow et al. 2008). Indeed, as 
pragmatics seems to suggest, linguistic symbols are a highly inferential commu-
nication system. And the more implicitly we are communicating, the more we 
need to be able to explicitly reason about other people mental states. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
 Summarizing the data discussed so far, negation can be considered a good ex-
ample supporting the hypothesis that speaking is a complex ability realized by 
means of at least two different mechanisms that are likely developed at different 
and consecutive steps of cognitive and linguistic development. In fact, categories 
of linguistic negation have different levels of complexity with different cognitive 
requirements. Rejection and non-existence can be explained in a simulative 
account. Denial, instead, needs an inferential explanation.  
 It is worth noting again, that these two steps of language competence, 
despite the fact that they develop consecutively, interact in adult language 
making it really difficult to isolate one from the other. 
 The final remark is about human nature, its phylogeny and ontogeny. 
Embodiment does not sufficiently explain human language and cognition. We 
also must look at the co-evolutionary relationship of culture/language and the 
brain. 
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